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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Power of State to Require Foreign
Mail-Order Seller to Collect Use Tax.—National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue}—National Bellas Hess, a national retail mail-
order house specializing in wearing apparel, is licensed to do business only
in Missouri, its principal place of business and where all its mail-order ac-
tivities take place, and in Delaware, where it is incorporated. Mail-order sales
are solicited by twice-a-year catalogue mailings addressed to over five million
active or recent customers on its mailing list, supplemented by an even
larger mailing of advertising flyers or sales books to both past and potential
customers. The supplemental advertisements are occasionally mailed in bulk,
addressed to "occupant." Customers mail their orders for merchandise to the
company in Missouri, from where, if the order is accepted, the merchandise is
sent to them by mail or common carrier. Customers who purchase merchandise
on credit mail their monthly payments to the company in Missouri. National
Bellas Hess regularly makes sales in Illinois in this manner.2
The Illinois Use Tax Acts imposes a tax "upon the privilege of using in
this State tangible personal property purchased at retail ... from a retailer." 4
The tax is to be collected from the purchaser by "a retailer maintaining a place
of business in this State," 6 and remitted to the Department of Revenue. A
"retailer" is defined to include any one " [e] ngaging in soliciting orders within
this State from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether
such orders are received or accepted within or without this State."°
When National Bellas Hess failed to collect and remit the use taxes
assessed on its mail-order sales to Illinois customers, the Illinois Department
of Revenue brought action in the Circuit Court of Cook County to recover
the assessment, plus a penalty, and was granted a summary judgment. On
appeal, 7 the Illinois Supreme Court found that the company was a "retailer
maintaining a place of business" in Illinois by virtue of its continuous local
solicitation of mail orders and the subsequent deliVery of the ordered mer-
chandise to local customers. The supreme court held that to require National
Bellas Hess to collect and pay the use taxes on those local mail-order sales
"does not deprive defendant of due process of law under the Federal or Illinois
constitutions nor does it violate the commerce clause of the Federal constitu-
tion."8 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, HELD: a state
may not constitutionally impose the duty of use tax collection and payment
1 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
2 The company sold over $2,000,000 worth of merchandise to Illinois customers during
the fifteen month period for which the taxes in question were assessed Id at 761.
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 439.1-.22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
4 Id. § 439.3.
5 Id.
o Id. § 439.2.
7 Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 III. 2d 164, 214 N.E.2d 755
(1966).
Id. at 172-73, 214 N.E.2d at 760.
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upon a seller whose only connection with customers there is by mail or
common carrier.°
The question of the power of a state to impose use tax obligations upon
an out-of-state seller has been raised in the Supreme Court six times in the
past twenty-eight years. 1 ° It is submitted that an examination of those deci-
sions reveals an unmistakable tendency to uphold the imposition wherever the
out-of-state seller's regular activities in the taxing state consist of direct and
continuous local solicitation of sales. It is further submitted, therefore, that
the instant decision adopts an erroneous approach to the question of a state's
use tax jurisdiction by emphasizing the fact that the out-of-state seller main-
tained no retail store, sales office or employees in the taxing state to solicit
local sales.
In Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher," the out-of-state seller was
not licensed to do local business and did not have any property in the taxing
state. It did, however, maintain two general agents there, for whom it hired
offices, to solicit local orders. The Court held California's use tax imposition
constitutional on the ground that the seller's elaborate arrangements for
soliciting local orders constituted the transaction of local business.
In Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,12 and in a companion case, Nelson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.," the Court held that Iowa may constitution-
ally require out-of-state sellers to collect the use tax imposed on mail orders
sent by kiwa residents directly to out-of-state mail-order houses and delivered
directly to the customers from there by mail or common carrier. Each seller
maintained local retail stores from which it made local sales, and operated a
mail-order business from separately administered out-of-state branches. De-
spite the fact that no local employee solicited the mail orders, the Court found
that they were in fact related to the seller's local activities. Justice Douglas,
delivering the opinion of the Court in both cases, observed in Sears,
Whatever may be the inspiration for these mail orders, however they
may be filled, Iowa may rightly assume that they are not unrelated
to respondent's course of business in Iowa. . . . Hence to include
them in the global amount of benefits which respondent is receiving
from Iowa business is to conform to business facts."
9 For a state court decision reaching the same result on almost identical facts see
State v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 277 Ala. 385, 171 So. 2d 91 (1965), followed in State v. Inn-
keepers Supply Co., 277 Ala. 476, 172 So. 2d 40 (1965).
10 The question of the power of a state to impose various other taxes upon a foreign
company engaged in interstate commerce has been frequently presented to the Supreme
Court during that period. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436
(1964) (gross receipts); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959) (net income); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590
(1954) (ad valorem); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. 0' Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (fran-
chise); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (sales). See
generally Developments in the Law—Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate
Business, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 953 (1962).
11 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
12 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
13 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
14 312 U.S. at 364. Justice Douglas' language referred to the test first enunciated by
Justice Frankfurter in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940), by which a
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In Montgomery Ward, the parties stipulated that the seller's local retail
stores displayed advertisements offering not only retail merchandise but also
the availability of a mail-order service using catalogues. The Court rejected
substantially the same arguments as were advanced in Sears and concluded
that the fact that "solicitation [of mail orders] was done through local
advertisements rather than directly by local agents as in Felt & Tarrant Mfg.
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, is immaterial." 15 By equating the local solicita-
tion of orders by agents with that by retail store advertisements, the Court
clearly found the specific means used by the out-of-state seller to stimulate
local orders to be constitutionally irrelevant. But the Court's stress upon the
totality of the out-of-state seller's course of business in the taxing state indi-
cated that it did not consider the presence of local agents or local retail stores
to be without constitutional significance.
Only three years later, however, in General Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n,16 the Court unequivocally dismissed the suggestion that the presence
of retail stores was necessary to the Sears and Montgomery Ward decisions. 17
In upholding Iowa's use tax imposition upon an out-of-state seller which con-
tinuously sent traveling salesmen into the taxing state to solicit local orders,
the Court also noted that a state's requirement that a seller collect the use tax
from the local purchaser is "a familiar and sanctioned device." 18 By finding
Felt & Tarrant indistinguishable, 19 the Court further emphasized the signifi-
cance of the organized nature, rather than the particular means, of the local
solicitation.
The state of Maryland relied heavily on General Trading to support its
imposition of a use tax upon a Delaware seller in Miller Bros. Co. v. Mary-
land.2 ° The company only sold goods to customers at its Delaware store, and
did not accept any telephone, mail or C.O.D. orders. But it advertised in
Delaware newspapers and on Delaware radio and television stations, within
whose circulation and broadcast areas were an unknown number of Maryland
residents. It occasionally sent direct mail circulars to all recent customers,
including those in Maryland, and occasionally even made deliveries there in its
own truck. In denying the power of Maryland to require Miller Brothers to
collect the use tax on sales to Maryland residents, the Court held that the com-
state may exert its taxing power: "That test is whether property was taken without due
process of law, or, if paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state." Id. at
444. Justice Frankfurter later stated in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946): "State
taxation falling on interstate commerce . .. can only be justified as designed to make
such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it
enjoys." Id. at 253.
15 312 U.S. at 376.
16 322 U.S. 335 (1944) .
17 Id. at 338.
18 Id. Accord, Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934) ("a common
and entirely lawful arrangement"). For a discussion of the methods available to a state
to enforce its sales and use taxes on consumer goods, particularly gasoline, liquor and
tobacco, see Note, Enforcing State Consumption Taxes on Out-of-State Purchases, 65
Harv. L. Rev. 301 (1951).
19 322 U.S. at 338.
20 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
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pany's activities in the taxing state did not satisfy the due process requirement
of "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." 21 It distinguished General
Trading's systematic method of local solicitation in Iowa from Miller Brothers'
casual and irregular course of business in Maryland:
[T]here is a wide gulf between this type of active and aggressive
operation within a taxing state and the occasional delivery of goods
sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than the inci-
dental effects of general advertising. Here was no invasion or ex-
ploitation of the consumer market in Maryland.22 (Emphasis
added.)
In a more recent case, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 23 the out-of-state seller
maintained no office, warehouse or other place of business in the taxing state,
and had no full-time employees there. It did, however, maintain ten brokers
there to actively conduct continuous solicitations of orders for its products
from local customers by means of catalogues, samples and other advertising
materials which it furnished. Although the written contract between Scripto
and each broker provided that the parties intended to create the relationship
of "independent contractor," the Court found that the distinction between
full-time "salesmen" and part-time "independent" brokers was without con-
stitutional significance.' The Court found the minimum connection required
by due process in the continuous local solicitations of the brokers, and con-
cluded that the case was controlled by General Trading. 25 By way of distinc-
tion, the Court noted that in Miller Bros., "there was no 'exploitation of the
consumer market'; no regular, systematic displaying of its products by cata-
logs, samples or the like,"" and emphasized the fact that "Marylanders went
to Delaware to make purchases—Miller did not go to Maryland for sales."27
After examining the facts of National Bellas Hess against the background
of prior cases, the majority rested its opinion almost solely upon the concept
that due process criteria limit the power of a state to impose use tax obliga-
tions upon an out-of-state seller to those situations in which the seller has some
property or personnel physically present within the state. 28 Specifically, the
majority declined
21 Id. at 344-45.
22 Id. at 347.
23 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
24 Id. at 211. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. at 447.
25 362 U.S. at 212.
28 Id .
27 Id.
28 National Bellas Hess also challenged the imposition as creating an unconstitutional
burden upon interstate commerce. The majority mentioned that the commerce clause
would be violated if a foreign company doing business by mail were required to collect
use taxes for every jurisdiction into which it shipped its goods, 386 U.S. at 759-60, but its
discussion appears to be unnecessary to the decision. The dissent, apparently disregarding
the possibility of the cumulative burden of multiple impositions, dismissed the majority's
comments alter a brief discussion in which it observed that the issue "should not give us
pause." Id. at 766. Thus, the decision does not provide any clear indication of when the
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to repudiate totally the sharp distinction which these and other deci-
sions have drawn between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solici-
tors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common
carrier as part of a general interstate business. 29
In so concluding, the majority stressed the distinction drawn in Sears between
mail-order houses with local retail outlets and sellers whose only connection
with local customers is by mail or common carrier and which, therefore, " 'are
not receiving benefits from [the taxing state] for which it has the power to
exact a price.' "30 It described Scripto as the "furthest constitutional reach to
date,"" and then contrasted the fact that Scripto had ten brokers conducting
continuous local solicitation with the fact that Miller Brothers had no local
retail stores and no local sales solicitors . 32 Observing that "here there was
neither local advertising nor local household deliveries," 33 the majority ap-
parently considered that Miller Brothers had greater contacts with Maryland
than National Bellas Hess had with Illinois.
By drawing the line of a state's use tax jurisdiction at a "physical" nexus,
the majority apparently overlooked the recurring distinction drawn by the
Court in prior decisions between the substance and the method of a seller's
local solicitations." That distinction was clearly stated by Justice Rutledge
many years ago when he observed that
administrative costs and mechanics of complying with a vast network of nonuniform
taxing statutes unduly burdens interstate commerce.
For a discussion of the relationship of the due process and commerce clauses in cases
involving a state's taxing power see Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A
Survey and An Appraisal, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1051, 1058-65 (1960).
22 386 U.S. at 758.
30 Id. In Sears, the Court rejected the seller's insistence that the imposition violated
the commerce clause because its mail-order business was in competition with out-of-state
mail-order houses which could not be reached for the tax by pointing out: "[T]hose other
concerns are not doing business in the state as foreign corporations. Hence, unlike re-
spondent, they are not receiving benefits from Iowa for which it has the power to exact a
price." 312 U.S. at 365.
31 386 U.S. at 757.
32 Id. at 757-58.
33 Id. at 759.
34 The Court has drawn a similar distinction in considering the analogous question of
the power of a state to subject a foreign corporation to suit. In the landmark case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Chief Justice Stone observed:
The test is not merely . . . whether the activity, which the corporation has seen
fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less....
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
Id. at 319. Compare Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), with McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569
(1958).
The various tests applied by the Court to determine whether a foreign corporation is
subject to a state's service of process, taxation, or regulatory jurisdiction all turn, to a
greater or lesser extent, on the corporation's nexus or connection or relationship with the
state. See Developments in the Law, supra note 10.
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every relevant constitutional consideration affecting taxation of
transactions, regular, continuous, persistent solicitation has the same
economic, and should have the same legal, consequences as does
maintaining an office for soliciting and even contracting purposes or
maintaining a place of business, where the goods actually are shipped
into the state from without for delivery to the particular buyer. 35
In every use tax case prior to National Bellas Hess, the Court has recognized
that distinction, and has adopted an approach which emphasizes the pervasive
nature, rather than the specific form, of the out-of-state seller's activities in
the taxing state. For example, in Miller Bros., when it distinguished General
Trading's activities in Iowa from Miller Brothers' activities in Maryland, the
Court characterized the former as "continuous," "active," and "aggressive,"
and the latter as "occasional" and "incidental." The Court observed that it
"could properly approve the State's decision [in General Trading] to regard
such a rivalry with its local merchants as equivalent to being a local mer-
chant," but then concluded that there was no equivalent "invasion or exploita-
tion" of the Maryland consumer market by Miller Brothers."
It is true that there has been some physical nexus between the out-of-
state seller and the taxing state in every case upholding the imposition of use
tax obligations. But it is also true that the physical nexus has always involved
an intensive and organized effort to develop and exploit the local consumer
market by some form of direct and continuous selling activity. In Montgomery
Ward, the Court found the distinction between the direct solicitation of sales
by local agents and that by local advertising to be constitutionally imma-
terial." In General Trading, the Court found the presence of local retail stores
in Sears and Montgomery Ward to be constitutionally irrelevant." In Miller
Bros., the only case where the Court found the seller's nexus with the taxing
state insufficient to satisfy due process criteria, Miller Brothers' contacts with
Maryland involved no regular or continuous selling activity, but rather were
the indirect effects of its doing business in Delaware." Thus, it would appear
that the nature and extent of National Bellas Hess' activities in Illinois are
substantially different from the nature and extent of Miller Brothers' activities
in Maryland, but are not significantly different from the nature and extent of
Sears' activities in Iowa.
That the scope of the out-of-state seller's selling activities in the taxing
state, and not the particular form those selling activities take, should be the
primary constitutional consideration in the Court's determination of the power
of a state to impose use tax obligations seems most logical. The fact that the
seller regularly and continuously solicits orders in the taxing state exclusively
by mail, rather than through sales personnel or property physically present
35 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 354 (1944) (concurring
opinion; also concurring in International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322
U.S. 340 (1944), and dissenting in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944)).
36 347 U.S. at 346-47.
38 312 U.S. at 376.
38 322 U.S. at 338.
35 347 U.S. at 347.
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there, should be immateria1.4° A seller will attempt to utilize the most
effective and economical method of inducing sales, and exploitation of a
consumer market by actively soliciting sales through a systematic and con-
tinuous direct mail campaign may be just as, if not more, effective and eco-
nomical as would soliciting sales directly through sales personnel or property
there. The majority apparently overlooked that obvious fact of business life.
Furthermore, the majority failed to recognize the fact that any seller
which regularly exploits a consumer market is participating in the benefits and
opportunities afforded by the taxing state. By providing a consumer market
for the seller to develop, the state "has given [something] for which it can ask
return": 44 the opportunity and privilege of exploiting a consumer market
which has been organized and regulated by the state for the benefit of sellers.
In the words of Justice Frankfurter:
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by
the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has
exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to
protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred
by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society. 42
The question of when an out-of-state seller's activities in a taxing state
provide a sufficient nexus to allow the state to impose collection duties upon
the seller is important not only to states 43 but also to retailers who regularly
conduct a substantial part of their business by mail or common carrier from a
single place of business. The practical answer of National Hellas Hess is that
a seller which actively and deliberately exploits the consumer market of a
taxing state by regularly soliciting local sales is liable for the collection of the
tax where it has a retail store, sales office or employees in the state, but is
immune from the collection liability when its only connection with the state
is the dissemination of advertising and the subsequent shipment of ordered
goods into the state by mail or common carrier. That answer, however, is not
entirely satisfactory because of an apparent conflict between the majority's
reasoning and the rationale of prior use tax decisions.
A possible resolution of the uncertainty raised by the instant decision
may be provided in future cases wherein state taxing authorities will rely upon
4° Cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961), wherein the Court
discussed the significance of the foreign corporation's maintaining a local office and
employing 18 "detailmen" who traveled in the state providing free advertising materials
to local retailers but who did not regularly solicit sales: "The fact that the business of
`inducing' intrastate sales . . . is primarily a promotional and service business which does
not include a systematic solicitaton of orders goes only to the nature of the intrastate
business ... , not to the question of whether [Lilly] is carrying on an intrastate business."
Id. at 282.
41 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444.
42 Id.
43 The use tax is important to the states because: (1) it protects local revenues by
discouraging local taxpayers from attempting to avoid the incidence of the local sales tax
by making out-of-state purchases; and (2) it protects local retailers from the competi-
tion of out-of-state merchants which are subject to little or no tax burdens. See Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. at 343; flenneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581
(1937) (Cardozo, J.).
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the dissent's reference to National Bellas Hess' presumably necessary utiliza-
tion of banking, credit and collection institutions in Illinois to determine the
financial circumstances of its Illinois customers who order goods on credit
plans as
 When considered in addition to the fact of regular solicitation by mail
of sales in the consumer market, the seller's use of local banking and credit
institutions may provide the required nexus to sustain the state's imposition of
use tax obligations. Such a practical approach to the facts of mail-order busi-
ness would offer the Court reasonable grounds for diktinguishing National
Belles Hess and for reestablishing the reasoning and .emphasis of prior use
tax cases.
DAVID J. LEVENSON
Insurance—Insolvency--General Agent's Right to Set Off Unearned
Premiums.—Korlanis v. E-Z Pay Plan, Inc. 1—Manhattan Agencies, Inc.
was a general agent which wrote automobile policies on young or "rated"
drivers for Superior Mutual Insurance Company and other insurance com-
panies. After a time of consistent dealing with each other, Superior encoun-
tered financial difficulties and was declared insolvent. As a result, all policies
written for Superior were cancelled. Subsequent to a notice of Superior's
insolvency, Manhattan, instead of remitting to the receiver in bankruptcy
the full amount of the premiums collected on behalf of Superior, returned
that portion of the premiums which became unearned because of the cancel-
lation to E-Z Pay Plan, Inc., as assignee of the policies. E-Z Pay was a
finance company which discounted the time payment contracts of Manhat-
tan's customers. On the theory that Manhattan was a trustee for both earned
and unearned premiums received from policyholders and, therefore, bound
to pay all receipts to Superior's receiver upon notice of Superior's insolvency,
an order was directed to Manhattan and E-Z Pay to show cause why Man-
hattan should not be adjudged to be indebted to Superior for the amount of
the unearned premiums and why both Manhattan and E-Z Pay should not
be held in contempt for a violation of the liquidation order.
The trial court found that Manhattan was a trustee of both the earned
and unearned premiums and that Manhattan was, therefore, a converter of
the money returned to E-Z Pay, and E-Z Pay a constructive trustee of the
refund for the benefit of Superior's receiver. On appeal by Manhattan and
E-Z Pay, the Supreme Court of Oregon HELD• The business conduct of
Manhattan and Superior over the years clearly indicates that they were at
all times dealing with each other as mutual debtor and creditor, and not as
44 Bellas Hess could not carry on its business in Illinois, and particularly its
substantial credit business, without utilizing Illinois banking and credit facilities.
. [Ili would ... be unreasonable to assume that the company does not either
sell or assign its accounts or otherwise take measures to collect its delinquent
accounts, or that collection does not include local activities by the company or its
assignees or representatives.
386 U.S. at 762.
1 428 P.2d 172 (Ore. 1967).
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